Why Encryption didn’t Save TJX
Apr 2, 2007 / By Paul Vallee
I’m sure everyone has heard about TJX’s recent data security “problems”, if that’s what you can call “the largest known customer record theft of all time”. The Chicago Tribune article linked above is well worth a read.
This eWeek article adds valuable details and analysis on how TJX had a data encryption
They quote TJX’s 10K filing:
“Despite our masking and encryption practices on our Framingham system in 2006, the technology utilized in the Computer Intrusion during 2006 could have enabled the Intruder to steal payment card data from our Framingham system during the payment card issuer’s approval process, in which data (including the track 2 data) is transmitted to payment card issuer’s without encryption. Further, we believe that the Intruder had access to the decryption tool for the encryption software utilized by TJX.”
And they interview Ted Julian, Application Security’s VP Strategy, where he says:
“I don’t care if it’s native encryption in an Oracle 10gR2 database or not,” he said. “It will be untenable.”
Obviously if the encrypted data is ever to be used again in the original form (as opposed to as a checksum), there will be vulnerabilities. Is Julian repeating that platitude or is there something to this event I have missed, I wonder.
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